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ABSTRACT
It is not surprising that the financing of early-stage creative projects and ventures is typically geographically
localized since these types of funding decisions are usually predicated on personal relationships and
due diligence requiring face-to-face interactions in response to high levels of risk, uncertainty, and
information asymmetry. So, to economists, the recent rise of crowdfunding - raising capital from many
people through an online platform - which offers little opportunity for careful due diligence and involves
not only friends and family but also many strangers from near and far, is initially startling. On the
eve of launching equity-based crowdfunding, a new market for early-stage finance in the U.S., we
provide a preliminary exploration of its underlying economics. We highlight the extent to which economic
theory, in particular transaction costs, reputation, and market design, can explain the rise of non-equity
crowdfunding and offer a framework for speculating on how equity-based crowdfunding may unfold.
We conclude by articulating open questions related to how crowdfunding may affect social welfare
and the rate and direction of innovation.
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1 Introduction
After raising $375k (all amounts in USD) in seed funding from several high-profile Silicon
Valley angel investors for an innovative e-paper display “Pebble” watch that enables users
to interact with their Android or iOS device through a wrist interface, inventor-entrepreneur
Eric Migicovsky required an additional $100k for tooling equipment to move from his pro-
totype to a small production run. Despite having production experience with a previous
watch he created for the Blackberry, experience raising seed capital, pedigree through his
a liation with a high-profile incubator (Y-Combinator), and being located in a region with
a high concentration of angel investors, he could not find a willing backer. On April 11,
2012, he turned to crowdfunding, with the goal of raising capital in small amounts from
many people through the Kickstarter online platform. He thus launched a campaign to
raise $100k, promising contributors a watch for every $120 (approximately) they pledged.
To his surprise, he raised the required capital in two hours. After 37 days, he closed his
campaign, having raised more than $10M from 68,929 people and committed to producing
85,000 watches with expected delivery by September that year.
Around the same time, on April 5, 2012, President Obama signed into law the Jump-
start Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act. In contrast to the already existing crowdfunding
platforms that enable individuals to raise funds as donations or in return for rewards (sim-
ilar to pre-sales of new products in some cases), a key provision of the JOBS Act legalizes
crowdfunding for equity by relaxing various restrictions concerning the sale of securities.1
However, the primary purpose of the Securities Act of 1933, which is the basis for most of the
regulations in question, is to protect investors. Thus, relaxing these restrictions raises the
concern that crowdfunding will expose investors to risk from fraud or incompetence (Hazen,
1For example, the law relaxes restrictions on general solicitation of securities, eases SEC reporting re-
quirements, and raises from 500 to 2,000 the number of shareholders a company may have and still remain
private.
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2012; Gri n, 2012). In the case of the Pebble, for example, despite disappointed and vocal
funders, the holiday season came and went without a single unit shipped or even produced.
Although the well-intentioned inventor posted regular updates on his progress as he sourced
components from vendors around the globe and set up a production facility in China, he was
not able to fill all of his crowdfunded orders until May 2013.2 Anticipating these types of
problems (and worse), the JOBS Act stipulated that equity crowdfunding required rules be
set by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which were anticipated for January
2013 but are still in progress as of this writing.
These two events in April 2012, the signing of the JOBS Act and the financing of the
Pebble, legislated and demonstrated an innovation in the market for early-stage finance that
could have significant economic consequences. Although the years of preamble leading to
these events occurred primarily outside of mainstream attention, both events, particularly the
former, raised general awareness of and interest in the potential of crowdfunding (Figure 1).
Furthermore, although not mainstream and not equity-based, the early years of crowdfunding
provide preliminary insight into the behavior of creators and funders. (For simplicity, we
group entrepreneurs, artists, and others who initiate projects or ventures under the label
“creators.” We group investors, pre-buyers, and donors under the label “funders.”)
Crowdfunding developed primarily in the arts and creativity-based industries (e.g., recorded
music, film, video games). Likely due to indirect network e↵ects and similar to other online
markets (e.g., eBay), crowdfunding has historically been dominated by a single platform (to
creators, the value of a platform increases with the number of funders, and to funders, the
value of a platform increases with the number of creators and other funders). Originally,
that was Sellaband, a music-only platform founded in 2006 and based in Amsterdam, and
subsequently it was Kickstarter, a broader creative projects platform founded in 2009 and
270,000 Pebbles were shipped as of May 2013, leaving 15,000 still to be delivered.
http://allthingsd.com/20130516/now-fully-kickstartered-pebble-raises-15m-in-venture-capital-from-crv/
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based in New York (we plot the growth of Kickstarter in Figure 2). Neither platform allows
creators to issue equity for funding, although Sellaband did facilitate revenue sharing with
funders during its first three years of operation. Still, data collected from funding activi-
ties on these platforms may provide clues to the types of user behavior that will emerge in
equity-based crowdfunding.
In particular, early research on non-equity crowdfunding indicates that:
1. Funding is not geographically constrained - When Sellaband o↵ered royalty shar-
ing to investors, more than 86% of the funds came from individuals who were more
than 60 miles away from the entrepreneur, and the average distance between creators
and investors was approximately 3,000 miles (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb, 2011).
2. Funding is highly skewed - On the same platform, whereas 61% of all creators did
not raise any money, 0.7% of them accounted for more than 73% of the funds raised
between 2006 and 2009 (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb, 2011). Similarly, outcomes
are highly skewed on Kickstarter, even conditioning the sample on successfully funded
projects: 1% (10%) of projects account for 36% (63%) of funds (Agrawal, Catalini,
and Goldfarb, 2013).
3. Funding propensity increases with accumulated capital and may lead to
herding - The propensity of individual funders to invest in a project increases rapidly
with accumulated capital. On Sellaband, in a given week, funders were more than
twice as likely to invest in creators who reached 80% of their funding goal, relative
to those who had raised only 20% of it (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb, 2011). The
acceleration is particularly strong towards the end of the fundraising campaign, similar
to online lending platforms (Zhang and Liu, 2012), and raises concerns of herding
behavior. At the same time, projects that are eventually successful might slow down
in the middle of the process because of a bystander e↵ect - a reduction in the propensity
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to fund by new individuals because of the perception that the target will be reached
regardless (Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2013).
4. Friends and family funding plays a key role in the early stages of fundraising
- Friends and family disproportionately invest early in the funding cycle, generating a
signal for later funders through accumulated capital. The asymmetry between friends
and family and others in terms of funding behavior is strongest for the first investment
decision but subsequently fades as funders are able to monitor the creator’s progress
directly on the crowdfunding platform (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb, 2011).
5. Funding follows existing agglomeration - Despite the decoupling of funding and
location, funds from crowdfunding disproportionately flow to the same regions as tra-
ditional sources of finance (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb, 2013), perhaps due to the
location of human capital, complementary assets, and access to capital for follow-on
financing.
6. Funders and creators are initially overoptimistic about outcomes - On Sella-
band, after a first wave of funded artists failed to deliver a tangible return on invest-
ment, funders revised their expectations downwards.3 Similarly, Kickstarter recently
faced pressures to adjust its guidelines after a number of high-profile projects encoun-
tered delays or failed to deliver on their initial promises. In the technology and design
categories on Kickstarter, estimates suggest that more than 50% of products are de-
livered late (Mollick, 2013).
7. Crowdfunding capital may substitute for traditional sources of financing
- Capital from crowdfunding may substitute for alternative sources such as home-
equity loans. As house prices rise in a specific geographic region, making it easier
3Even artists with a tangible track record, such as Public Enemy, found it increasingly di cult to raise
funds. http://techcrunch.com/2010/10/28/public-enemy-just-raised-75k-on-sellaband/
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for entrepreneurs to use home-equity loans as a source of financing, the number of
entrepreneurs who turn to crowdfunding decreases (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb,
2013).
Economic theory helps to explain these findings and, more generally, the recent rise
in crowdfunding activity. Why was crowdfunding for early-stage creative projects not a
meaningful method of finance before the commercialization of the internet? First, matching
funders with creators is now more e cient and e↵ective due to lower search costs online.
Second, risk exposure is reduced because funding in small increments is economically fea-
sible online. Finally, low communication costs facilitate better (though far from perfect)
information gathering and progress monitoring for distant funders and also better enable
funders to participate in the development of the idea.
These non-equity-based crowdfunding characteristics also apply in the equity setting.
However, there are many important di↵erences. Unlike non-equity crowdfunders who make
funding decisions based on their own interest in the o↵ering, an equity funder must also
assess the expected demand from others. To the extent that creators are able to raise capital
and demonstrate demand through non-equity crowdfunding (e.g., “pre-sales”), thus avoiding
dilution, and then raise later-stage capital from established investors with status, reputa-
tion, a valuable network, and an ability to engage in follow-on financing rounds, creators
with high-quality inventions may have little incentive to employ equity crowdfunding. Fur-
thermore, traditional equity investors may be able to o↵er capital at a lower price than
equity crowdfunding because they are able to conduct face-to-face due diligence and thus
are better able to assess risk and return. Indeed, after demonstrating customer demand in
a non-equity crowdfunding setting, the creator of the Pebble chose to raise his next round
of $15m from traditional equity investors through conventional channels.4
4This series A round was led by Charles River Ventures. http://techcrunch.com/2013/05/16/pebble-
nabs-15m-in-funding-outs-pebblekit-sdk-and-pebble-sports-api-to-spur-smartwatch-app-development/
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In general, the most critical di↵erences between equity and non-equity crowdfunding will
arise due to the amplification of information asymmetries. Whereas the asymmetry problem
currently concerns the feasibility of and the creator’s ability to deliver the product, in the
equity setting the asymmetry problem includes the above as well as the creator’s ability
to generate equity value by building a company rather than just delivering a product. In
the absence of strict governance, reporting, accounting, and other requirements common in
publicly traded securities markets, crowdfunders are subject to an unusually high degree of
risk. Will risk levels be so high that either the market fails (low volume of trading) or social
welfare is reduced due to excessive harm to funders?
Because equity crowdfunding is not yet established, we lack the data to answer this
question.5 Instead, we outline a framework for addressing it. We begin by identifying the
primary actors in this market (creators, funders, platforms) and describe their primary in-
centives and disincentives for engaging in it. Then, focusing on the disincentives, we describe
potential sources of market failure (adverse selection, moral hazard, collective action). Next,
we characterize various market design features that may diminish disincentives and thus re-
duce the potential for market failure (reputation signaling, rules and regulation, crowd due
diligence, provision point mechanism). Finally, we circle back to the open questions of the
potential e↵ects of crowdfunding on social welfare and the rate and direction of innovation.
However, we begin with a characterization of the polarized debate about the potential for
crowdfunding between experts in the popular press.
5There are, however, several existing platforms, such as AngelList in cooperation with SecondMarket,
that enable equity crowdfunding, but only for accredited investors. At present, the scale of their online,
platform-based investment activities seems limited, but appears to be growing quickly.
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2 Competing Views in the Popular Press on Equity-
Based Crowdfunding
Many business experts have weighed in on the potential benefits of crowdfunding. For ex-
ample, they have opined on its potential to increase the total capital allocated to innovation,
fund good ideas that might otherwise be undercapitalized, generate jobs, and evolve through
experimentation:
“Fred Wilson, a prominent venture capitalist, calculates that if Americans used
just 1% of their investable assets to crowdfund business they would release a $300
billion surge of capital.” - The Economist6
“Crowdfunding has the potential to revolutionize the financing of small business,
transforming millions of users of social media such as Facebook into overnight
venture capitalists, and giving life to valuable business ideas that might otherwise
go unfunded.” - The Wall Street Journal7
“Besides, isn’t this the type of innovation we should be encouraging? Unlike exotic
derivatives and super-fast trading algorithms, crowdfunding generates capital for
job-creating small businesses.” - The New York Times8
“Robert Litan of the Kau↵man Foundation, a think-tank, believes venture-capital
firms would boost crowdfunding if, say, they lent their reputations to young firms
and promised to invest later if they met certain targets. With so much promising
6http://www.economist.com/node/21556973
7http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323468604578251913868617572.html
8http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/opinion/a-proposal-to-allow-small-private-companies-to-get-
investors-online.html
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experimentation in the works, Mr. Litan says, let’s just hope the SEC doesn’t kill
it o↵ before it gets started.” - The Economist9
At the same time, other experts have taken positions at the opposite end of the spec-
trum, focusing on legitimate concerns such as the potential for fraud, unrealistic investor
expectations, the opportunity cost of lost expert advice, and inexperienced creators:
“...crowdfunding could become an e cient, online means for defrauding the in-
vesting public.” - Wired10
“The honeymoon period that we are experiencing around crowdfunding is begin-
ning to come to a close, said Wil Schroter, co-founder and chief executive of
FundablePeople realize there is real risk involved in investing in anything early-
stage, whether it’s an idea, a charity or a product, and they’re starting to under-
stand they aren’t buying o↵ of Amazon.” - The New York Times11
“While founders raising cash from a big pool of small amounts of money are ben-
efiting from quick access and the boost of popular interest, they are also forgoing
some of the advice and experience of more traditional angel or venture-capital
investors.” - The Financial Times12
“Anecdotal reports abound of flawed products (try Googling “jellyfish death trap”),
overambitious creators who can’t pull o↵ what they promised, and epic delays. A
CNNMoney investigation found that 84% of Kickstarter’s 50 top-funded projects
9http://www.economist.com/node/21556973
10http://www.wired.com/business/2011/12/crowdfunding-big-thing-fraud/
11http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/technology/success-of-crowdfunding-puts-pressure-on-
entrepreneurs.html
12http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/42ee668c-302c-11e2-891b-00144feabdc0.html
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missed their estimated delivery dates.” - CNNMoney13
Given the polarized debate on the benefits and costs of crowdfunding, it is perhaps
surprising that the JOBS Act passed with unusually broad bipartisan support. However,
the concerns expressed here may partly explain the SEC delay on setting the rules. We
turn next to economic theory and evidence from research in di↵erent, but related, online
markets to construct a framework for speculating on which market design features may be
most important for reducing the likelihood of failure in the market for equity crowdfunding.
3 Incentives
There are three primary actors in crowdfunding: 1) creators, 2) funders, and 3) platforms.
We summarize the incentives for each in terms of their motivations for engaging in crowd-
funding. We then examine their disincentives.
3.1 Creator Incentives
Creators may choose to raise capital through crowdfunding rather than a traditional channel
due to two primary incentives: 1) a lower cost of capital, and 2) access to more information.
We describe each below.
3.1.1 Lower cost of capital
Creators typically access capital for early-stage ventures from sources such as personal sav-
ings, home-equity loans, personal credit cards, friends and family members, angel investors,
and venture capitalists. Under certain conditions, crowdfunding may enable creators to
access capital at a lower cost than traditional sources for three reasons:
13http://money.cnn.com/2012/12/18/technology/innovation/kickstarter-ship-delay/
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1. Better matches: Creators match with those individuals who have the highest will-
ingness to pay for equity in their venture (or for early access to their new product,
etc.) where the search for such matches occurs across a global rather than local pool
of potential funders. Thus, as opposed to traditional o✏ine mechanisms for financing
early-stage creative ventures, access to capital is not so strongly influenced by the cre-
ator’s location. Indeed, in Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2011), we report that on
Sellaband, more than 86% of the funds came from individuals who were more than 60
miles away from the creator, and the average distance between creators and funders
was approximately 3,000 miles.
2. Bundling: Non-equity-based crowdfunding demonstrates that under certain condi-
tions funders value early access to products, recognition for discovering innovations,
participating in a new venture’s community of supporters, and other non-pecuniary re-
wards in return for financial backing. To the extent that platforms facilitate a hybrid
approach and allow creators to bundle the sale of equity with other rewards they wish
to o↵er (e.g., early access to products, limited-edition products, recognition), creators
may be able to lower their cost of capital by “selling” goods that are otherwise di cult
to trade in traditional markets for early-stage capital.
3. Information: To the extent that crowdfunding generates more information than tra-
ditional sources of early-stage capital (e.g., interest from other investors, ideas for prod-
uct modifications and extensions from potential users), this information may increase
funders’ willingness to pay, thus lowering the cost of capital. For example, despite the
negative reaction Pebble creator Eric Migicovsky received from traditional early-stage
investors, the information conveyed via the crowdfunding community’s strong response
to his product validated his hypothesis that a wearable device with that particular de-
sign and set of features would have broad appeal. This information likely lowered his
11
cost of capital. However, in principle, the same e↵ect could be achieved without crowd-
funding by pre-selling the invention and then presenting the sales information when
raising capital through traditional channels. Furthermore, if the additional informa-
tion is negative relative to expectations, then this may work in the opposite direction
and increase the cost of capital.
Finally, if crowdfunding increases competition in the supply of early-stage capital, then
it may drive down the cost of capital across other channels for early-stage funding.
3.1.2 More information
In addition to the e↵ect that more information may have on the cost of capital, it may
also have other benefits for creators. For example, in the hybrid context where funders
are also able to obtain early access to the product, crowdfunding serves as a particularly
informative type of marketing research, which is often modeled as reducing the variance
of post-launch demand (Lauga and Ofek, 2009). Like marketing research, crowdfunding
that allows pre-buying provides an informative signal of post-launch demand. Unlike most
marketing research, crowdfunding can include advanced selling, which provides incentive-
compatible demand signals, thereby substantially increasing the quality of the signal (Ding,
2007). Thus, crowdfunding reduces the noise associated with assessing demand prior to
the launch of a fundamentally new product. This can lead to an increase in the number
of products launched and to a higher rate of success among launched products (Lauga and
Ofek, 2009).
In addition to a market signal concerning the demand for a product (either real de-
mand as reflected through pre-sales or predicted demand as reflected through equity sales),
crowdfunding provides creators a mechanism through which they may receive input on their
product or business plan from users and investors. This may facilitate the early development
of an ecosystem around the product. In the case of the Pebble watch, for example, users
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have proposed software applications that they or others could write to take advantage of the
unique features of the device, expanding the possibilities for it and increasing its value for
new potential users. For instance, one person suggests:
“Pebble would be a perfect device for coxes and coaches in rowing. I’ve seen many
a cox risk his iPhone by taking it out to time races and such, and sooner or later
there’s a water issue. It’s a rough and wet environment out there. Very hard
on phones, but perfect for Pebble! Pebble would be able to connect to a hidden
and protected iPhone, relaying stroke rate, timings, and even (if the messaging
limitations could be circumvented somehow) delivering instructions from a coach
on shore.”
Similarly, the community of potential users also weighed in on other product features,
such as the need to include support for Bluetooth 4.0. The creator responds:
“Dear Kickstarter backers... Today, we’d like to announce that your enthusiasm
has helped convince us to move the entire Pebble roadmap forward and bring you
a brand new feature. Bluetooth 4.0 - inside every Pebble! All Pebble watches will
support Bluetooth 2.1 (as before) as well as Bluetooth 4.0 (Low Energy).”
Although the benefits of user-driven innovation are well documented (von Hippel, 1998;
Baldwin, Hienerth, and von Hippel, 2006; Chatterji and Fabrizio, 2011), crowdfunding plat-
forms allow creators to engage potential users in the ideation and design of a product even
before it has been produced. However, although this information may be valuable to the
creators since it may help them develop products that better match the needs of future
users, it is an open question whether the feedback from funders is informative about the
wider market.
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3.2 Funder Incentives
Heterogeneous in their motivations, funders engage in crowdfunding for at least five distinct
incentives. These incentives include:
1. Access to investment opportunities: This applies to equity crowdfunding only.
Traditional mechanisms for funding early-stage ventures typically restrict funders to
local investment opportunities. Furthermore, regulations have until recently restricted
most non-family and friend investment opportunities to accredited investors. Gubler
(2013) describes crowdfunding as “giving ordinary investors the opportunity to get in
on the ground floor of the next big idea.”
2. Early access to new products: To the extent that hybrid crowdfunding models
enable creators to bundle equity with early access, pre-buying may play an even greater
role in the crowdfunding process. Non-equity crowdfunding demonstrates a perhaps
surprising level of demand for early access to new products by unknown creators.
The Pebble watch is again illustrative. There may be benefits to enabling product
enthusiasts to be early shareholders since this would align their incentives with their
means to enhance the value of the company.
3. Community participation: For many funders, investing on a crowdfunding platform
is an inherently social activity, and they commit capital partly to obtain preferential
access to the creator (e.g., updates, direct communication), which they value. They also
derive consumption value from the feeling of being part of the entrepreneurial initiative
(Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2010) and among a select group of early adopters.14
Relatedly, some funders seem motivated to provide funding in return for recognition
from the creator within the community.
14“If I like the personality of the team, I may donate even if I don’t intend to use the
product myself. By donating to Fara I was able to live vicariously through the dev team.”
http://www.wired.com/gamelife/2012/02/kickstarter-blindside/
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4. Support for a product, service, or idea: Philanthropy plays a surprisingly signif-
icant role on the major crowdfunding platforms (e.g., Kickstarter, Indiegogo). Some
funders support projects, including for-profit projects, without receiving a tangible re-
ward and also do not participate in the associated online community. It is an open
question whether this behavior will persist in the equity crowdfunding setting, but
given the focus on new ventures with new products, it may.
5. Formalization of contracts: As in other settings, early investors on crowdfunding
platforms are often family and friends who invest to support the entrepreneur (Agrawal,
Catalini, and Goldfarb, 2011). Crowdfunding platforms act as an intermediary and
formalize what would otherwise be informal finance. In this way, they improve on the
financial contracts between family and friends by balancing the benefits and costs of
social relationships (Lee and Persson, 2012). Whereas family and friends can use social
pressure to incentivize the entrepreneur, their presence also discourages ex-ante risk-
taking in the absence of a formal contract, since failure could also negatively impact
the social relationship.
3.3 Platform Incentives
Crowdfunding platforms are predominantly for-profit businesses. Most employ a revenue
model based on a transaction fee for successful projects, typically 4-5% of the total funding
amount. As such, their objective is to maximize the number and size of successful projects.
This requires attracting a large community of funders and creators as well as designing
the market to attract high-quality projects, reduce fraud, and facilitate e cient matching
between ideas and capital (e.g., by increasing the degree of disclosure by the entrepreneurs
and allowing for e↵ective search on the side of the funders). Crowdfunding platforms also
have an incentive to attract projects that can generate a disproportionate share of media
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attention, because they both expand the existing community of funders (further increasing
network e↵ects) and allow the platform to expand into new categories (Kain, 2012).15
3.4 Disincentives for Creators
Although the incentives to use crowdfunding are compelling for some creators, crowdfunding
also presents certain challenges. Perhaps the greatest of these is the disclosure requirement.
Other sources of funding, like home-equity loans, friends and family members, and angel
investors, allow creators to keep their innovation secret from the general public, including
competitors, prior to selling their product or service. However, crowdfunding requires cre-
ators to disclose their innovations in a public forum. The disincentive is strongest for those
creators who are most worried about imitation, especially during the period between raising
capital and launching their product, when the di↵erence between crowdfunding and other
sources of capital in terms of disclosure risk is most severe.
In addition to the risk of disclosing too much information to competitors, this requirement
may have negative repercussions on intellectual property protection (patentability) and on
bargaining with potential suppliers. For example:
“Quest did not have contracts already in place before he went on Kickstarter - a
novice mistake. Once the Hanfree was funded, Quest says, he began contracting
with accessories manufacturers in China, Singapore, and Los Angeles. But be-
cause those manufacturers were able to see precisely how much money Quest had
raised on Kickstarter, Quest says they gained too much leverage in negotiations,
chipping away at the product’s margins. It soon became too expensive to create
the product with the funds raised.” (Markowitz, 2013)
The disclosure risk is accentuated in the equity crowdfunding setting since creators must
15AngelList does not have an explicit revenue model at the time of this writing. Recognizing the critical
role of network e↵ects in this setting, the company appears focused on building its user base at present.
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disclose their plans for the company (e.g., strategy, key employees, customers, costs) in
addition to their new product or service.
A second challenge comes from the opportunity cost of raising capital from “the crowd”
rather than professional investors. Angel investors and VCs, for example, often bring ad-
ditional value to the company, such as industry knowledge, relationships, and status (Hsu,
2004). Not only are non-professional crowdfunders less likely to bring these benefits, they
are also less likely to make the e↵ort to confer these benefits to the creator (if they could)
because the returns for doing so are much lower given their typically much smaller level of
investment.
Investor management presents another challenge. Because crowdfunders generally fund
in smaller amounts than, say, angel investors, more investors are required to raise a given
amount of capital. Investor management therefore may be significantly more costly due to
the sheer number of funders who need to be managed. The process can be particularly
daunting as the number of investors rises. In the case of the Pebble watch, as of March
2013, the team had delivered 34 detailed updates about the software and manufacturing
of the product and received about 14,000 comments from the Kickstarter community.16
Moreover, whenever a project fails to meet a deadline or expectations, funders typically
demand increasing levels of attention. Although such interaction allows creators to collect
feedback, it also diverts resources and time from execution. Max Salzberg, who unexpectedly
raised $200K on Kickstarter (from a $10K initial target) to develop an open-source alternative
to Facebook, described his team’s experience as “so consumed with things like answering e-
mails and making T-shirts for their contributors that they had little time to build the software”
(Wortham, 2012).
Furthermore, since creators have no control over who funds their projects, they have
no way to prevent funders with di↵ering visions and strong personalities from joining and
16http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/597507018/pebble-e-paper-watch-for-iphone-and-android/posts
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adversely a↵ecting the community’s dialogue.17 Furthermore, in the case of equity crowd-
funding, creators may find it di cult to raise follow-on financing with an “unorthodox cap
table” that includes a large number of dispersed small investors. However, platforms will
likely recognize this risk and structure investments in such a way as to minimize this problem
(e.g., aggregate investors in a GP/LP-type structure). In the case of AngelList, for example,
investments are “pooled into a fund created and managed by SecondMarket which, in turn,
invests in the startup. Only the fund is listed on the startup’s cap table - the individual
investors in the fund are not.”18
In summary, creators who incur greater-than-average costs from disclosure and/or derive
greater-than-average benefit from professional investors above and beyond access to their
capital will be less likely to seek capital through crowdfunding.
3.5 Disincentives for Funders
Funders face three primary disincentives: creator incompetence, fraud, and project risk. All
three are exacerbated by the particularly high degree of information asymmetry associated
with equity-based crowdfunding in an environment with minimal oversight and regulation
(i.e., funders have much less information than creators). We describe each below.
1. Creator Incompetence - To date, funders on crowdfunding platforms have been
relatively optimistic about the ability of creators to deliver on their promises. As more
projects successfully raise capital and then fail to meet milestones, platforms have
realized that it is in their interest to recalibrate the expectations of the community and
have thus increased disclosure requirements for creators.19 However, creators often have
17“Aside from raising the money, it really is an exercise in engaging with
your fans and having a conversation with them and getting them involved.”
http://www.npr.org/blogs/therecord/2012/11/23/165658174/how-much-does-crowdfunding-cost-musicians
18https://angel.co/help/invest
19http://www.kickstarter.com/blog/is-lateness-failure and http://www.kickstarter.com/blog/kickstarter-
is-not-a-store
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little experience in building a product and dealing with logistics and suppliers. Projects
that exceed their funding goal by large amounts often deliver late (if at all), since they
are unable to adjust to demand (Pepitone, 2012). Delays can be substantial: In a study
of the design and technology categories on Kickstarter, out of 247 successful projects
that promised to deliver goods, more than 50% were delayed, and the average delay
was more than two months (Mollick, 2012). The issue is so prevalent that Kickstarter
recently started to tighten its requirements and reject an increasing number of projects,
in particular if they involve a hardware component (Hurst, 2012). This change has
prompted an increasing degree of platform shopping, with some of the more uncertain
projects landing on other platforms.
2. Fraud - Inexperienced and overly optimistic investors may not only channel capital
towards bad projects but also subject themselves to outright fraud. It is relatively easy
to use false information to craft fraudulent pages that look like authentic fundraising
campaigns. While platforms try to filter out such cases of manipulation, crowdfunding
may become an appealing target for professional criminals. Furthermore, because
investments are small, the risk is exacerbated by weak individual-level incentives to
perform due diligence. To the extent that the cost of performing due diligence is
high and the individual benefit low, the crowdfunding community may systematically
underinvest in due diligence; instead, funders may free-ride on the investment decisions
of others, which is feasible to do since funding information is public and funders usually
cannot be excluded. Moreover, relative to platforms such as eBay and Airbnb, where
sellers have an incentive to build a reputation to signal against fraud, the lack of
repeated interaction over a short period of time increases the potential for fraud.
3. Project Risk - Early-stage projects and ventures are inherently risky. In other words,
there is a significant chance of failure. Many sources of potential failure exist above
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and beyond creator incompetence and fraud. Although funders are able to incorporate
risk into their investment decisions, information asymmetry (i.e., creators have more
information about risks than funders) may significantly increase the cost of these risks
to investors.
The disclosure risk faced by creators and all three risks faced by funders are predicated on
information asymmetry between creators and funders. In the next section, we describe how
information asymmetry may lead to market failure and thus stifle the potential of crowd-
funding to improve social welfare through gains from trade between creators and funders.
Then, in the following section, we discuss potential solutions to these market failures.
4 Market Failure
Creators almost always have more information than funders about their projects or ventures.
However, the information asymmetry problem is exacerbated in the case of early-stage ven-
tures raising capital in a lightly regulated environment where funders are remote and have
limited opportunity to perform due diligence in person with the creator. This leads to the
three problems for funders described in the prior section (incompetence, fraud, project risk).
These problems potentially lead, in turn, to market failure. In other words, value-creating
transactions between creators and funders (capital in exchange for equity or other rewards)
are not completed due to the information problem.
For example, on a crowdfunding platform, it is particularly di cult for funders to assess
the true ability of the creator or the underlying quality of the project or venture. Funders
may discount the value of ventures on the platform as a result. If so, then high-quality
ventures will avoid raising capital on the platform because they cannot achieve a “fair” price
for their equity in that forum. In turn, the platform tends towards a suboptimal equilibrium
where only low-quality ventures use it for funding. In other words, the market fails to
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facilitate welfare-enhancing transactions between high-quality creators and funders. This is
a form of adverse selection.
Furthermore, the imbalance between the two sides of the market is not limited to ex-ante
information about creator and idea quality but is also due to the funders’ ex-post inability
to induce e↵ort on the side of the creator. Historically, the “crowdfunding contract” is based
on goodwill and o↵ers limited tools to funders once they commit their capital (that is, when
the fundraising is closed). The creator may behave in a short-term opportunistic manner
and not exert the level of e↵ort that was implied at the outset. This is a form of moral
hazard. The most extreme example of this is outright fraud. Anticipating the potential for
this type of behavior, funders may be deterred from allocating capital in this setting, leading
to market failure.
Finally, the market may fail due to a collective action problem. Since funding information
is public and investment levels are low, which limits the potential upside benefits from
investing, funders may free-ride on the due diligence e↵orts of others by waiting to observe
their funding decisions. To the extent that all funders take this approach, the market will
fail as everyone waits and nobody invests.
5 Market Design
The rules, technical features, and cultural norms established by individual platforms, along
with overall industry regulations, will shape the behavior of creators and funders and ulti-
mately determine the extent to which the market for crowdfunding operates e ciently or
succumbs to market failures. Here, we describe four broad categories of market design mech-
anisms that have been deployed in non-equity crowdfunding or other online market settings
and may be e↵ective in reducing information-related market failures in equity crowdfunding:
1) reputation signaling, 2) rules and regulation, 3) crowd due diligence, and 4) provision
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point mechanism. The first three potentially reduce the information asymmetry between
creators and funders (helping overcome both adverse selection and moral hazard), and the
fourth may diminish the collective action problem. We describe each below.
5.1 Reputation signaling
Traditional markets for the financing of early-stage creative projects or ventures rely heavily
on due diligence predicated on face-to-face interactions and personal relationships. In the
crowdfunding setting, creators disclose as much information as they wish and then rely on an
ethos of “trust me.” Market design may influence the e cacy of a “trust me” environment
by facilitating markets for reputation. In other words, in crowdfunding markets, as in many
other online markets, reputation and trust are particularly important. Cabral (2012, p. 344)
emphasizes the important role of reputation as a mechanism for establishing trust to address
the risk of fraud in online transactions: “While there are various mechanisms to deal with
fraud, reputation is one of the best candidates - and arguably one of the more e↵ective ones.”
Designers of online markets have developed many mechanisms for establishing trust through
reputation. Broadly, these can be divided into three types of tools: 1) quality signals, 2)
feedback systems, and 3) trustworthy intermediaries.
1. Quality signals - First, and perhaps most simply, participants in online marketplaces
can provide credible signals of quality by leveraging brand reputation. Waldfogel and
Chen (2006) demonstrate the importance of brands in signaling quality in online mar-
ketplaces. Importantly, they show that as information becomes more accessible, the
importance of brands diminishes. Lewis (2011) further examines the role of informa-
tion access and shows that the voluntary disclosure of private information increases the
prices of used cars on eBay. There are other ways to signal quality, even if product in-
formation cannot be credibly communicated. For example, Roberts (2011) shows that
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warrantees provide a credible quality signal, and Elfenbein, Fisman, and McManus
(2012) show that tying charitable donations to online auctions seems to provide an
informative quality signal. Patents may also serve as a signal of quality (Ha¨ussler,
Harho↵ and Mu¨ller, 2012), in particular during earlier stages of financing and when
information asymmetry is likely to be high (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013). Similarly, VCs
often consider previous successful experiences by the entrepreneur, senior executives
on the founding team, and founders with doctoral degrees as useful signals of quality
(Hsu, 2007). Finally, in the crowdfunding context, the level of education (e.g., share
of executives with an MBA degree), has been shown to be positively correlated with
successful fundraising (Ahlers et al, 2012).
2. Feedback systems - Many online marketplaces provide users a mechanism for sub-
mitting feedback that contributes to building a reputation for individual buyers and
sellers. The most basic versions of these mechanisms simply report sales information.
Tucker and Zhang (2012) demonstrate that reporting sales information has important
e↵ects on choices. It gives a signal similar to the social network mechanism currently
emphasized in crowdfunding. More sophisticated mechanisms rely on ratings systems
to provide reputation information. This literature emphasizes the eBay ratings sys-
tem, but the ideas are more widely applicable (Cabral, 2012). The idea behind this
mechanism is to allow market participants to rate their experience after a transaction.
For example, eBay’s current mechanism has buyers rating sellers. If sellers generally
provide a high-quality experience, then their ratings will be good. New buyers will
see the high ratings, place further trust in the seller, and be willing to pay a higher
price. A long literature demonstrates the importance of seller (and buyer) ratings to
outcomes on eBay and other platforms (reviewed in Cabral, 2012 and Cabral and Hor-
tacsu, 2010). However, creators on crowdfunding platforms are less likely to repeatedly
raise capital over short periods of time, reducing the frequency with which the com-
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munity can rate them. To avoid this problem and still derive value from an online
reputation system, a potential solution is for creators to divide larger projects into
smaller milestones (not unlike staged financing in traditional settings, used to reduce
funder risk).
3. Trustworthy intermediaries - Third-party intermediaries that provide quality sig-
nals and facilitate trust between marketplace participants exist in a variety of markets.
For example, Jin and Kato (2007) demonstrate the importance of third-party quality
certification in the thriving online market for collectibles where, for instance, agencies
certify the quality of sports cards. Rather than simply saying “high quality,” a seller
can post a certified and verifiable quality level, providing buyers a reliable signal of the
product’s quality. Since it is in the certification agencies’ financial interest to provide
honest ratings, both buyers and sellers trust them. This phenomenon is not unique
to third-party certification. Stanton and Thomas (2012) examine independent workers
in online labor markets who form teams (that look like firms) in order to leverage the
reputation of established workers to improve job opportunities for new workers. Fun-
ders also increasingly use Facebook and other large social networks such as Twitter
and Linkedin to validate user profiles when moral hazard is a concern.
In summary, reputation can be a powerful antidote to information asymmetry and moral
hazard problems. Users on both sides of the market can take multiple approaches to develop
their reputation, such as quality signals, feedback systems, and trustworthy intermediaries.
However, although these mechanisms have been quite e↵ective in other online markets, they
may require adaptation for the particular characteristics of equity crowdfunding.
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5.2 Rules and Regulations
A second way in which markets can overcome information-related market failures is through
regulations and rules, both at the platform level and the government level.
5.2.1 Platform rules
Crowdfunding platforms continue to adapt their rules in response to user behavior in order
to maximize transaction volume. For example, Kickstarter recently allocated additional
resources to detect fraud, implying that its management believes the benefits of doing so
(lower risk for funders) outweigh the costs (increased monitoring costs for the platform and
higher disclosure burden on creators). However, Kickstarter made it clear that ultimately it
is still the funders’ role to perform due diligence on the competence of creators:
“We’ve also allocated more sta↵ to trust and safety. We look into projects re-
ported by our community for guidelines violations and suspicious activity, and
we take action when necessary. These e↵orts are focused on fraud and acceptable
uses of Kickstarter, not a creator’s ability to complete a project and fulfill. On
Kickstarter, backers ultimately decide the validity and worthiness of a project by
whether they decide to fund it.”20
Kickstarter also has taken steps to better set expectations for both creators and funders:
“As Kickstarter has grown, we’ve made changes to improve accountability and
fulfillment. In August 2011 we began requiring creators to list an “Estimated
Delivery Date” for all rewards. This was done to make creators think hard about
when they could deliver, and to underline that Kickstarter is not a traditional
shopping experience.”
20http://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kickstarter%20basics
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Finally, recognizing that some types of projects are more prone to disappointment than
others, the platform increased the burden of disclosure on creators of design and technology
products:
“In May 2012 we added additional guidelines and requirements for Product De-
sign and Technology projects. These include requiring creators to provide infor-
mation about their background and experience, a manufacturing plan (for hard-
ware projects), and a functional prototype. We made this change to ensure that
creators have done their research before launching and backers have su cient
information when deciding whether to back these projects.”
Given platforms’ incentives to maximize successful funding campaigns, we anticipate that
platforms will continually modify their regulations and monitoring as well as react to user
behavior in search of striking the appropriate balance between minimizing the disclosure and
administrative burdens on creators while maximizing the information available to funders
about quality, e↵ort, and risk of fraud.
5.2.2 Industry regulation
The JOBS Act requires the SEC to establish rules for the equity crowdfunding industry.
Initially, these rules were to be released in early 2013. However, as of this writing, they
have not yet been announced. Overall, the primary motivation for these rules is investor
protection. While many potential risks to investors may be addressed in these regulations,
we draw attention to three major ones. First, funders likely will be limited in their level of
exposure to any single crowdfunding investment. Specifically, the Crowdfund Act (S.219021)
stipulates that funders may not invest more than 10% of their annual income or net worth
and are capped at $100,000 in any single investment opportunity (Sec.2.a.B.ii). Furthermore,
21http://beta.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-bill/2190/text
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if either their income or net worth is less than $100,000, then they may only invest up to 5%
of the lesser of their income or net worth up to a maximum of $2,000 (Sec.2.a.B.i).
Second, platforms must register with the SEC, educate investors (e.g., level of risk, risk
of illiquidity), take steps to reduce the risk of fraud (e.g., by performing history checks on
o cers and directors of the venture or anyone holding more than 20% of the outstanding
company equity), and verify that investors have not exceeded their yearly investment limits
across all platforms (Sec.4.A.a). Recently, the SEC informed two platforms (AngelList and
FundersClub22) that the Commission would not recommend enforcement action against them
as they begin to provide equity crowdfunding to accredited investors. Whereas this does not
allow the general public to invest, it is a first step towards approving additional intermediaries
and ultimately implementing the Crowdfund Act.
Third, firms will be limited in the amount of capital they can raise through crowdfunding
($1 million cap) and will be subject to non-trivial disclosure regulations. As the North Amer-
ican Securities Administrators Association points out: “The crowdfunding exemption is only
an exemption from securities law registration requirements. It does not change the securities
law disclosure requirements. The requirements of federal and state securities laws regard-
ing disclosures, including disclosures of all material facts and risks to investors, remains in
place.”23
Finally, the Crowdfund Act specifies the use of a financing threshold to prevent creators
from taking capital from funders despite not being able to raise enough to do what they have
described they will do, which we discuss below in Section 5.4 (provision point mechanism).
22http://techcrunch.com/2013/03/31/sec-angellist-greenlight/
23http://www.nasaa.org/13676/small-business-advisory-crowdfunding/
27
5.3 Crowd Due Diligence
A third way that markets can overcome information-related failures is through crowd due
diligence. Relative to traditional investors, individual crowdfunders are disadvantaged in
terms of due diligence because they typically have a much smaller stake and therefore less
incentive to spend time and money investigating creators. This yields a potentially severe
free-rider problem. At the same time, typically many more crowdfunders are reviewing any
given project or venture than in traditional settings, such that a greater number of individuals
and variety of perspectives are available to notice something amiss. For example, only two
days and approximately $4K into an $80K fundraising campaign for an action video game
on Kickstarter, two potential investors flagged the project as fraudulent and notified others:
“The concept art at http://www.mythicthegame.com/concept-art.html was bla-
tantly stolen from two di↵erent people in the competition at
http://conceptart.org/forums/showpost.php and the character art was stolen from
this guy http://genzoman.deviantart.com/ [...] and the facebook page which re-
cently went down had pictures of o ces like this: http://i.imgur.com/uTCBT.png
which were blatantly stolen from Burton Design group [...] In summary, this is
a blatant scam.”24
In other settings, the crowd has produced mixed results in terms of monitoring and due
diligence. For example, eBay partly relies on the community to detect fraud, though it
complements this with considerable investments in data analytics, buyer protection through
PayPal, and platform regulation.25 Wikipedia relies on its most active community mem-
bers to protect entries from vandalism.26 Volunteers and software bots track new pages for
24http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/273246798/mythic-the-story-of-gods-and-men/comments
25http://www.fastcompany.com/46858/how-ebay-fights-fraud,
https://www.quora.com/Fraud-Detection/What-techniques-and-algorithms-does-eBay-use-to-prevent-
fraud-among-its-buyers-and-sellers
26http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Counter-Vandalism Unit
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copyright violations, spam, and vandalism as well as recent changes to entries of particular
interest. Pages can also be placed under di↵erent levels of protection (administrators can
only edit entries under full protection).27
At the same time, the bottom-up process of revisions by the community is far from perfect:
Over time, it has become increasingly di cult for new Wikipedia editors to have their
contributions accepted (Halfaker et al., 2012). Moreover, most of the process of convergence
towards a neutral point of view seems to be driven more by the introduction of new articles
with a di↵erent slant than by the reduction of slant in the original pages (Greenstein and
Zhu, 2012).
Furthermore, in the context of funding, the crowd is subject to herding behavior. Much
of the existing research on crowdfunding has emphasized that funders rely heavily on accu-
mulated capital as a signal of quality (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb, 2011; Zhang and
Liu, 2012; Burtch, Ghose, and Wattal, 2011; Freedman and Jin, 2011). Thus, the sequen-
tial nature of investment has the potential of triggering an information cascade. This path
dependence suggests that funding success will only reflect underlying project quality if early
funders do a careful job screening projects.
Herding behavior can be e cient under certain conditions but lead to suboptimal out-
comes in others. For example, Zhang and Liu (2012) provide preliminary evidence that ac-
cumulated capital is a credible signal of quality in a donation-based, online lending setting.
They argue for “rational herding” as investors use the decisions of others as an informative
signal of project quality. Freedman and Jin (2008) show the usefulness of social networks in
overcoming asymmetric information in online lending markets. Similarly, using data from
a journalism crowdfunding platform, Burtch, Ghose, and Wattal (2013) demonstrate that
the decisions of others provide an informative signal of quality (and hence also provide a
marketing function for the final product).
27http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:FULL#Full protection
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The information conferred by early funders in Agrawal, Catalini and Goldfarb (2011)
is less obvious. Although this study reports that the first few thousand dollars usually
required weeks to raise while accumulating the last few thousand often took just a few hours
(perhaps reflecting due diligence by early investors), the data reveals that early funds often
come disproportionately from family and friends of creators. On the one hand, funding
decisions by family and friends may confer useful information given the knowledge these
people have about the creators (e.g., an inability to raise funds from family and friends may
send a particularly important signal). On the other hand, the variation across creators in
funding raised from family and friends may also reflect the wealth of creators’ social networks
rather than the underlying quality of their projects or companies.
Furthermore, the information cascade may be manipulated. At the extreme, creators may
exploit the path-dependent nature of investment by injecting capital in the early stages,
thereby inducing an information cascade, and then withdrawing their capital before the
fundraising is closed. Obviously, this problem may be minimized by thoughtful rules and
features implemented by platforms. Overall, the evidence suggests that information from the
crowd reflected in accumulated capital can be an informative, but noisy, signal of quality.
Overall, crowd due diligence serves as a complement to other mechanisms in order to
enable many online platforms to thrive despite substantial information asymmetries in the
absence of face-to-face interaction or trusted intermediaries.
5.4 Provision Point Mechanism
Reputation signaling, rules and regulations, and crowd due diligence all help to overcome
issues related to asymmetric information between creators and funders and opportunistic
behavior by creators after they raise capital. In particular, these mechanisms provide infor-
mation about quality, create incentives for e↵ort, and minimize the potential for fraud.
As described above, another source of information-related market failure in crowdfund-
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ing is coordination failure among funders due to the free-rider problem. Precisely because
of information cascades described above in our discussion of crowd due diligence, where
early funders generate a valuable (although noisy) signal for later ones through accumulated
capital, all investors have an incentive to wait and see what others do.
Almost all non-equity crowdfunding platforms have applied some form of a “provision
point mechanism” (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989) to address this problem. Specifically, the
creator only receives the funds if a funding threshold level is reached (or surpassed) within a
certain period of time. This particular type of contract is a solution to a classic coordination
and free-riding problem that arises in the provision of public goods: Whereas a group of
individuals may be better o↵ by a project being funded, if ex-post it is impossible to exclude
non-funders from benefiting from it, ex-ante individuals rationally decide to wait, making
fundraising impossible. By implementing a provision point mechanism, crowdfunding plat-
forms eliminate the risk to funders of providing funds for a project that is unable to raise
enough capital to be viable. Although most existing platforms have voluntarily implemented
some form of a provision point mechanism, the Crowdfund Act indicates that this market
design feature will likely be mandated, as intermediaries will need to:
“ensure that all o↵ering proceeds are only provided to the issuer when the aggre-
gate capital raised from all investors is equal to or greater than a target o↵ering
amount, and allow all investors to cancel their commitments to invest, as the
Commission shall, by rule, determine appropriate.” (Sec. 4A.a.7)28
6 Open Questions
On the eve of the opening of a new marketplace facilitating the exchange of capital for
equity in small new ventures - which some experts describe as “transformational” for national
28http://beta.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-bill/2190/text
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competitiveness and prosperity and others as “disastrous” for inexperienced investors and
thus society - the list of open questions is large. However, from the perspective of this
volume’s focus, two questions stand above the rest. The first concerns social welfare and the
second innovation.
At the most fundamental level, policy support for crowdfunding exemptions in the JOBS
Act is predicated on the assumption that equity crowdfunding will have a net positive e↵ect
on social welfare.29 But will it? How might this occur? Furthermore, crowdfunding may
enhance the rate and direction of innovation, which could benefit welfare by improving private
returns and increasing socially beneficial externalities. How and why might crowdfunding
influence innovation this way? We turn now to these two related policy questions.
6.1 Social welfare
Crowdfunding will almost surely generate social loss by relaxing traditional regulations as-
sociated with the sale of securities (e.g., enabling new forms of fraudulent activity as well as
new ways for inexperienced or reckless individuals to make poor allocation decisions for their
savings). To what extent will the social gains from crowdfunding outweigh these losses?
Social benefits will be of two types. First, crowdfunding will generate private gains from
trade. Creators and funders freely exchange equity for cash only if the expected benefit to
each is positive (allowing for side payments and consumption value).
Second, crowdfunding will generate additional gains associated with benefits to others
that result from the trade. In particular, given crowdfunding’s focus on early-stage ventures,
many of which may be innovative as has been the case in non-equity crowdfunding, there
may be significant spillover externalities of the type commonly associated with innovation.
For example, crowdfunding facilitated an initially significant production run of the Pebble
29http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-o ce/2012/04/05/president-obama-sign-jumpstart-our-business-
startups-jobs-act, http://majorityleader.gov/newsroom/2012/02/house-republicans-unveil-the-jobs-act-to-
spur-small-businesses-and-startups.html
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watch, which embodies novel ideas that others may build on. Some of those ideas may
be patented, such that follow-on work privately benefits the inventor of the Pebble by way
of license fees, whereas other ideas will be freely usable by others and thus enhance the
productivity of subsequent innovators - a social gain. For example, in the case of the Pebble,
the inventor produced a software development kit (SDK) such that follow-on inventors can
explicitly develop new products for this wrist-based platform, potentially enhancing both
private and social gains.
6.2 Innovation
Will equity crowdfunding influence the rate and direction of innovation? In other words, to
what extent will it a↵ect the number as well as the types of innovations that are funded?
Crowdfunding may influence the rate of innovation by increasing the total amount of funding
available to innovative new ventures. At the same time, it may influence the direction of
innovation by changing the way in which capital is allocated to innovative new ventures.
This could result from, for example, the crowd having access to di↵erent information than
traditional sources of capital,30 having a di↵erent objective,31 or having di↵erent opportu-
nities to mitigate risk.32 It is possible that crowdfunding only changes the rate, but not
the direction, of innovation by increasing the total amount of funding without influencing
the allocation algorithm.33 Finally, crowdfunding may not increase the rate or direction of
innovation in a tangible way because the costs to funders are still too high (due to risk of
30For example, members of the crowd may have a relationship with the entrepreneur and/or a wider base
of experience and industry insight than the local angel and VC communities.
31For example, the crowd may value the creation of a new product or service in addition to maximizing
their financial return on investment.
32For example, since transaction costs are lower, the crowd is able to make smaller investments and thus
is able to spread its capital over a greater number of projects than, say, a traditional friends-and-family seed
or angel investment.
33For example, without crowdfunding, the top 100 ventures are financed, and with crowdfunding, the top
100 plus the next 10 are funded. In other words, the additional capital from crowdfunding is allocated at
the margin towards the ventures that are next in line to be financed in the no-equity crowdfunding regime.
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fraud, for example). Furthermore, even if crowdfunding does appeal to a large number of
funders, it may simply substitute for other forms of funding, crowding them out such that
neither the amount nor allocation of funding is a↵ected.
6.2.1 Geographic distribution
One dimension on which we may expect crowdfunding to deviate from traditional funding
is the spatial allocation of capital. Because transactions occur online rather than in person,
factors that influence the geography of traditional forms of early-stage investments may be
less important in the crowdfunding setting. Indeed, Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2011)
show that the localization bias in funding activity on Sellaband is virtually eliminated after
controlling for social relationships (friends and family). Overall, funding is not localized: A
full 86% of capital for successfully financed projects came from individuals who were more
than 60 miles away from the creator, and the average distance between creators and funders
was approximately 3,000 miles. Thus, it is plausible that crowdfunding may be particularly
important as a mechanism to finance projects in regions that have disproportionately less
access to financial capital relative to their stock of human capital. In other words, it seems
plausible that the spatial distribution of crowdfunding capital may look quite di↵erent from
that of traditional capital.
We use data from Kickstarter to provide some preliminary insights into this question. We
find that crowdfunding capital follows a surprisingly similar geographic pattern to traditional
funding. Our data contain every funded project between launch (June 2009) and October
2012. The data spans 27,403 projects totaling $293 million in 13 categories. We have
information on the timing of financing and the location of the projects.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the states in which Kickstarter-financed projects
are based and other sources of funding. Figure 3a shows a strong correlation between state-
level funding from the National Endowment for the Arts and funding for arts-related projects
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on Kickstarter (all in per capita terms). Figure 3b shows a strong correlation between state-
level venture-capital financing (source: MoneyTree Report, 2009-201234) and funding for
technology projects on Kickstarter (though this correlation is weaker than for the arts).
We interpret Figure 3 as suggesting that so far non-equity crowdfunding does not appear
to deviate significantly from the traditional geographic distribution of capital allocation.
However, that may reflect the distribution of human capital and thus does not necessarily
imply that crowdfunding is not financing di↵erent types of innovation.
Figure 4 maps the location of Kickstarter funding, with the darker coloring suggesting
more funding for the state. We also list the top three states for each category. The overall
pattern seems to be much the same as the scatter plots in Figure 3: New York and California
dominate, and large, technology-intense states are darker in color. After New York and
California, Tennessee is important for music and Illinois for publishing and theater.
It is important to note that, even if we did observe significant variation in the geographic
distribution of capital between crowdfunding and traditional channels, this may be less
salient for equity crowdfunding than what we observe in non-equity crowdfunding due to
follow-on financing risk (Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013). Ventures that require up to
$1m in seed capital at first but whose business plans call for significantly more in the near
future may find it di cult to raise even their initial capital through crowdfunding if they
are located in regions that lack a su ciently active market for follow-on capital. That is
because funders may worry about the venture’s ability to raise subsequent capital due to
their location, also recognizing that ventures are restricted from raising more than $1m per
year via crowdfunding.
34The MoneyTree Report is published by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the National Venture Capital As-
sociation, and is based on data from Thomson Reuters (https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/).
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6.2.2 Substitution with regular sources of finance
Further preliminary evidence that crowdfunded projects are similar in terms of their spatial
distribution to other forms of funded projects comes from an examination of substitution
between sources of finance. Specifically, in Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2013), we ex-
amine how changes in local (city-level) house prices correlate with changes in crowdfunding.
Robinson (2012) shows that home-equity financing is an important source of funds for en-
trepreneurs. We show that the relative price and availability of these funds is related to the
use of crowdfunding. Specifically, when house prices are higher (and home-equity financing
is therefore more readily available), the use of crowdfunding falls. While this analysis is
preliminary and does not completely control for the unobservable aspects of the strength of
the local economy, it does suggest that, for some projects, crowdfunding may compete quite
directly with regular sources of financing and therefore enable projects that are similar to
those historically financed through traditional channels.
At the same time, we find a handful of exceptions. In particular, a careful look at the
map (Figure 4) shows some perhaps surprising locations for crowdfunding. Minnesota is
third in technology, North Carolina is third in food, and Massachusetts is third in fashion
(Arizona is fourth). Crowdfunding therefore might also facilitate the funding of projects
that transcend the specialization of a region and are more di cult to fund otherwise. Given
the skewed distribution of outcomes associated with innovation, these “exceptions” may be
economically important in the long run.
6.3 Future research
It will be years before we have the time series data required to fully address the empirical
question of the impact of crowdfunding, both equity-based and non-equity-based, on welfare
and innovation. For example, the key empirical challenge in estimating the causal impact
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of crowdfunding on the number and type of projects or ventures funded is the identification
of the ventures that would not have been funded in their absence. Ideally, we would like to
compare all ventures funded in a world without crowdfunding to one with (holding everything
else constant).
Unfortunately, such a counterfactual is very hard to find. Many platforms accept funds
and projects from any country, and the rate of adoption of crowdfunding across di↵erent
geographic regions will not be exogenous to their existing level and type of inventive activity.
However, if, for example, the rules set by the SEC progressively allow for projects that satisfy
di↵erent requirements to access equity crowdfunding, then the variation in timing of adoption
by di↵erent categories of projects (e.g., size, industry, degree of risk) could be exploited to
understand if crowdfunding has a comparative advantage in funding more versus di↵erent
ideas using a regression discontinuity approach.
7 Conclusions
Although it is impossible to predict with certainty how equity crowdfunding will evolve,
experimentation will surely play an important role. Crowdfunding platforms will compete
on variations in market design, employing di↵erent rules for engagement and tools for rep-
utation, crowd due diligence, and provision point mechanisms, among others. New markets
for trusted intermediaries will likely emerge.
Despite the best e↵orts of policy makers and platform designers, there will surely be spec-
tacular failures. Funders will lose significant sums, not only to fraud, but also to incompetent
managers, bad ideas, and bad luck. Entrepreneurs will litigate their investors, and investors
will litigate entrepreneurs. Ideas and intellectual property will be stolen due to early-stage
public disclosure. The growing pains experienced by the equity-based crowdfunding indus-
try will be even more dramatic and severe than in the non-equity setting. Throughout the
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mayhem, policy makers will be faced with the question of whether, in the long term, the
benefit from the private gains from trade (cash for equity) as well as from the social gains
due to spillovers and other externalities will outweigh these significant costs.
As usual, eventually, the market will likely solve many of its own problems through in-
novation. Just as the non-equity-based crowdfunding industry, without policy intervention,
converged on the provision point mechanism as a now-standard feature in market design to
reduce free-riding, fierce competition in the new equity-based setting will stimulate innova-
tion and reduce market failure. At the same time, regulation surely will play an important
role. Likely, the first iteration of industry rules and regulations, although carefully consid-
ered, will require many amendments as entrepreneurs and investors learn to interact in this
new setting, platforms innovate, and cultures form.
Furthermore, the benefits from crowdfunding will not be uniformly distributed. Certain
types of ventures will benefit more than others from this new form of finance. For exam-
ple, the types of ventures that may disproportionately benefit include those with consumer
products where the value proposition can be easily communicated via text and video and
where the product is unique and not subject to easy imitation when publicly disclosed. Even
still, these ventures may prefer to raise their funds from traditional sources unless the cost
of capital is significantly lower or they are able to derive additional benefits from interacting
with a crowd of heterogeneous, geographically dispersed funders.
Fortunately, since crowdfunding occurs online, many of the actions of entrepreneurs
and investors are in digital form and thus leave a data trail. Venture characteristics, en-
trepreneurial traits, investor histories, investment decisions, platform-based communications,
and many other features are in these data. Unlike other channels for early-stage capital
but like other online markets, the data collected on participant behavior will be extensive
(so-called “big data”). Crowdfunding data will provide an unprecedented window into early-
stage equity investment activity. These data and the analyses they enable will be a valuable
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tool for policy makers and platform designers for addressing market failure through the
adaptation of market design. This will enhance their ability to harness the upside potential
of crowdfunding and realize the social gains from trade that may result from financing an
important yet potentially undercapitalized sector of the economy.
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8 Figures
Figure 1: Google Search Volume for “Crowdfunding” (100 represents peak search volume)
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Figure 2: Total Capital Raised (thousands) on Kickstarter by Successful Projects between
June 2009 and October 2012
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Figure 3: Kickstarter Funding versus Other Sources of Funding
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(a) Kickstarter Funding in the Arts per Capita by National Endowment for
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Figure 4: Kickstarter Projects by State (darker colors have more financing)
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